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Abstnα ct

This P αper α可 u es th叫 ， given th e l egα cy of Chiη ese communzsm αηd its political structure , co 付uption， together with th e threα t of punishment for co 付upt wn αnd th e selec tive
enforcement of this threα t ， serves αsα method of compensα tion thα t both s α tisfies th e political obj ectives of the Communist Pαrty α nd provides αn effective inducement to locα 1 officials
to promote economic reform
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Many observers have suggested that a large part of the success of the Chinese economic
reform is attributable to the transformation of the typical local government official from
being an unproductive political entrepreneur prior to reform to being a productive economic
entrepreneur after reform. As Weiyi時 Zhang and Gang Yi (1996) point out ,
Many reform programs have been initiated by locals and even by the grass-roots ,
and then recognized and adopted as national policies by the central government
Much of the planning system was dismantled by locals. Many locals have been
far ahead of their national leaders in reforming the economy.
Emphasiz呵 the

initiatives of local officials , Kang Chen , G. Jefferson , and 1. Singh (1992)

characterize economic reform in China as being both a top-to-bottom and a bottom-to-top
process
At the same time , and apparently paradoxically, both Chinese and foreign observers report that economic reform in China has been associated with an epidemic of corruption
among local government 0侃 CJ悶als. Melan
凹 Manion (1997 , page 34) observes that "of the
54 countries ranked by the Berlin-based public interest organization , Transparency International , according to the prevalence of corruption in 1996 , China ranked 50th: corruption was
judged more pervasive only in Bangladesh , Kenya , Pakistan , and Nigeria ."
Taken together these observations are puzzling. How can pervasively corrupt local officials be the key to the success of economic reform? Furthermore , why do the Chinese
authorities tolerate widespread corruption among those agents whose performance is essential to economic reform?
This paper attempts to answer these questions. We first elaborate on why the actions of
local officials have been critical in China's economic transition. Then we explore how local
officials have been motivated to promote economic reform and why the Chinese authorities
are willing to live with this way of motivating local

0伍 cials.

Our analysis wiU develop

the following hypothesis: Becαuse of the leg α cy of σ12nese comr月untsm α nd its politicαl

structure ,

cor門tp tion ， tog e th e r 凹的 lh e

en.f.ο rcemen t

of this threat ,

lhr -ea l of punishment f or

serves αsα method

of

corrupliοηα nd

compensα tion th α t

th e selec liv e

both satisfies the

politicαJ

objectives of th e Communist Party αnd provides αn ejJective indu cement to l ocα l officials to
promote economic reform
In arguing that selective toleration of corruption “works'\ we a re not claiming ei ther that
all of the widespread corruption that we observe in China is instrumenta l or that corruption is
not to some extent incidental , in the sense of being a concomitant of economic reform that is
beyond the power of the authorities to prevent without incurring large costs . We also are not
claiming that selective toleration of corruption is an optimal method of compensation , eithel
from the perspective of the Chinese authorit ies of from t he perspective of the average Chinese
person . But , we are claiming t h at , whether the adopt ion of t he policy of selective toleration
of co rrup t ion was active or passive , there a re good reasons for the Chinese authorities to live
wi th th is policy.l
The idea t h at corruption can facili tate economic development is n ot new. 2 But , a lt hough
t he literat ure dis cusses various positive effects of tolerating corruption , it d oes not a ddress
the question of why the authorities li ve wit h a p olicy of selectively tolerating corruptio丸
when feasible alternatives presumably exist. Writing about contemporary Chi n a , Howard
D av ies

(1 995 , page 165) points out that

“ oppo山川 ies

for corr upti on arise to a very g reat

extent because of t he administrative controls whi ch still remain in the Chinese econ omy and
because the government of t he PRC h as not yet established m echanisms for preventing the
abuse of these controls". Still , the question remains of why t he Chinese authorities h ave not
lIn contrast to some literature -

5前，

assume that the aut h oriti臼

have

without ass uming that the

a uthoriti郎，

for example, Abhijit Banerjee

( 1997) 一 our

analysis does not

limited ability to punish corruption . We rationali ze tolerance of corruption
by imposing sufficiently severe penalties on enough corrupt local

officials , could not eliminate all or most corruption
2S amuel Hunti時don (1968) is a classic reference. Fr ancis Lui (1985) prov id臼 a n example of a formal

model of the benefits from corruption

2

eliminuted the conditions that breed corruption among local officials
The Dual- Tr ack Economy and the Role of Local Officials
Although recognition of the

e 伍 ciency

of a market economy relative to central planning

was an important motivation for the initiation of economic reform in China , the Chinese
have not as yet completely eliminated central planning as a coordination mechanism for
production and exchange. Instead , China has adopted a dual-track economy

(Shuα句 Gui

Zhi) , which involves the coexistence of central planning with a market mechanism for the
allocation of resources. Olivier Blanchard and Michael Kremer (1997) argue convinci 時 ly
that the dual-track economy, preserving elements of central planning , has helped China
to maintain economic growth during the transition to a market economy. Bl anchard and
Kremer sharply contrast China 's smooth transition to the “disorganization" and asso ciated
collapse of production during the transition to a market economy in the states of the former
Soviet Union. Lawrence Lau , Yi時yi Qian , and Gérard Roland (2000) argue further that
the dual-track economy has provided a way to compensate potential losers from economic
reform in China
A criti callegacy of central planning in China , which remains important in the dual-tra ck
economy, is Guanxi arrangements , whereby "personal

connections刊 among

government of-

ficials and firm managers control the allocation of resources. Under Guanxi firm managers
have to maintain good relations with relevant government

0伍 cials

and managers of other

firms to ensure the provision of supporting resources (e.g. electricity, water , etc.) and the
timely delivery of necessary raw materials and intermediate goods. Davies (1995) describes
how

Guα nxi

has evolved in China as a response , rooted in Chinese culture , to an underde-

veloped system of property rights and contract law
In this environment the transformation of local 0伍 cials from unproductive political entrepreneurs to productive economic entrepreneurs has been critical to the success of Chinese
economic reform for two apparent reasons: First , because government 。但 cials had the high-

3

est social and economic status prior to reform , they are likely to include some of the most
talented people in China. Second , in the dual-track economy, especially with the continued impo 1' tance of Guαnxi ， local officials continue to play an critical 1'ole in coordinating
production and exchange
In post-refo 1' m China local 0伍 cials are often de facto managers. Fo 1' example , Jean Oi
(1995 , 1998) thinks the role of local officials in the economy is so important that she terms
China 's current political-economic system "local state

corporatism刊﹒ As

Oi observes (1995 ,

page 1132) ,
The state responsible fo 1' much of this growth is

locα1

governments that t 1'eat

enterprises within their administrative purview as one component of a large corporate whole . Local officials act as the equivalent of a board of directors and
sometimes more directly as the chief executive officers
In anothe 1' p 1'ovocative study entitled "Local Governments as Indust 1' ial Firms ," Andrew
Walder (1995) argues that local officials in China 's dual-track economy and corpo 叫 e hierarchies in a market economy play similar roles in coo 1' dinating production and exchange
Oi claims further that , in response to the new incentives asso ciated with Chinese economi c
reform , local 。而 cials not only imp 1' oved thei 1' e伍 ciency in coordinating production and
exchange , but they also began actively to play some new roles. 3 According to Oi (1995 ,
pages 1139-1140) ,
Within a local corporatist context local officials turn the administrative bureaucracy -

of which they are

part 一 into

a free channel for information and re-

sources to facilitate market production ... Using information and contacts that
they develop beyond the locality through their routine conduct of administrative work , local officials can provide an array of essential services to their local
3For other relevant studies of enterprise management in China , see Andrew Walder (1 998) , Jane Duckett
(1996) , and David Li (1996)

4

enterprises. This might include raw materials , but increasingly, it has become important for information about new products , technology and markets for fìnished
goods .. .Iρcal

CadleS use their expansive connections and bureaucratic position

to secure information that wiU serve local economic growth

What is Corruption?
It is important to be clear about how we are defìning corruption. On our defìnition corruption is , in the words of Melanie Manion (1997) ,“ the use of public office to pursue private
gain in ways that violate laws and other formal

rules. 刊 We

use this legalistic defìnition for

three reasons: First , this defìnition accords with everyday language . Second , this defìnition
is used in in the compilation of data and is implicit in quantitative observations about the
amount of corruption . Third , and most importantly, this defìnition does not prejudge the
economic consequences of corruption
Instead of our legalistic defìnition many authors implicitly adopt an economic defìnition
that equates corruption with purely unproductive rent-seeking activity.4 By abstra cting from
the positive incentive effects that we emphasize , these authors presuppose that corruption
has only a negative effect on economic performance. In contrast , without denying that some
of the corruption that we observe iri China involves unproductive rent seeking , we want to
allow for the possibility that corruption also includes practices that enhance productivity
Our legalistic defìnition of corruption , which accords with everyday speech and with measures
of corruption , does not preclude the conclusion that tolerance of corruption can promote
economic reform and improved economic performance
Manion (1997) associates corruption in China with two general practices: One practice
involves local officials who exploit their positions to extract bribes or to arrange nepotisti c
favors . This practice is often referred to as
4S間 ，

tαnwu

shouhui in Chinese. The other practice

for example, Dan Usher (1 992) , Andrei Shleifer and Rob ert

Francis Lui (1999)
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Vish 叮 (1993) ，

and Isaac Ehrlich and

involves local officials who misappropriate public property or public funds for personal benefi t. Examples include the use of public property or public funds to obtain lavish housing
and fancy cars or to travel abroad. This practice is often referred to as nuoyong

go ηgku αn

in Chinese
Corruption as a Method of Compensation
What has motivated local 0伍 cials to become efficient economic entrepreneurs? More
completely , what have been the incentives for local

。而 cials

to promote economic reform ,

and what has been the system of rewards and punishments through which these incentives
have been implemented?
Some recent literature argues out that a positive relation between the economic performance of a region and local tax revenue provides local Chinese officials with incentives to
promote economic reform and growth. For example , Susan Shirk (1993) claims that "fiscal
decentralization is the ‘cornerstone ' of China 's economic

reform . 刊 In

an interesting compar-

ative study, Roger Gordon and David Li (1997) claim that local officials have much more
strongly supported new non-state firms in China than in Russia , because local governments
can obtain revenue from taxes on new entrants in China , but not in Russia
The existing literature , however , does not adequately address the critical question of ho \V
localo伍 cials

themselves benefit from the increased revenue in their administrati ve region

Although Oi , Walder , and other observers emphasize the role of local officials in coordinating
production and exchange and in providing information about new products , technology , and
markets , their writings do not explain how the Chinese local 0伍 cials are compensated for
these essential services
As Jane D
formal employees of firms. Then how do the firms compensate these officials? Two practices
suggest themselves: the extraction of bribes or nepotistic favors

(tαm山 sho 的 ui)

and the

appropriation of public property or public funds for personal benefit (nuoyong gongku αηj
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Both of these practices are forms of corruption. In fact , fiscal decentralization facilit ates
both of these form s of cOLTuption , and the Chinese authorities have vigorously promoted
fis cal dece ntralizati on. Both of these observations are consistent with our view that mu ch of
the corruption that we observe in China is instrumental
The Economic Fu nction of Corruption
Does selective toleration of corruption provide an effective inducement to local 0伍 cials to
promote economic reform? To motivate local 0伍 cials ， who are its agents , the Chinese central
government , as principal , would like to reward behavior that contributes to good economic
results and to punish behavior that contributes to bad economic results. But , the centr al
government cannot perfectly monitor the efforts of local 0伍 cials. Given their better access
to informa tio n , loca l 。而 cials often are able to conceal from the central government t h at a
good outcome resulted fr om good luck rather than from extra effort or that a bad outcome
resulted from poor e叮o r t rathe r than from bad luck. Local officials naturally will exaggerate
both the importance of their e 旺。 rts in producing a good outcome and the imp ortance of bad
luck in producing a bad outcome
As Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizi o Zilibotti (1996 , 1999) argue , the problems of incomplete information and asymmetr ic information between principal and agent , wh ich complicate many principal -agent relations , are probably even more severe in poor and developing
economies like China than in Western economies. The extensive literature on the principalagent problem generally concl udes that , although incomplete and asymmetric information
compli cates the design of incentive schem es , Western economies have invented and implemented methods of compensati on that work reasonably well to motivate agents. As this
li terature expla ins , incomplete and asymmetric information lead the principa l both to decentralize t he de ter minati on of compensation and to share the profits and losses of the
enterpri se with the agent. 5
5 Ed

wa rd Lazear (1 995) provides a comprehensive

su 附y
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of this literature

The important observation is that in China the use of corruption as a me t. hod of compensation embodies a decentralized compensation scheme and a sharing of pro fì. ts and losses
in much the same way as methods of compensation implemented in \Vestern economies
Corruption , whether in the form of 的 nW1L shou/wi or

n1wyong

gongk 1L a n, mitigates the prob-

lem of measuring and monitoring economic performance because those local 0伍 cials who
make the largest economic contribution are likely to be able to extract the largest bribes or
nepotistic favors or to have the most valuable public property to appropriate. Also , the compensation that local officials obtain through corruptio九 particularly in the form of bribery ,
is paid directly by local firms , which have the best information on the performance of local
o伍 cials

Importantly , the Chinese authorities have eschewed the explicit implementation of

meth 司

ods of compensation commonly used in Western economies to solve the problems of incomplete and asymmetric information. Nominally the incomes of local

。而 cials

are fixed and

unrelated to their performance. The fact that the Chinese authorities have not instituted
any alternative mechanism for providing appropriate incentives to local
with

ourγiew

0伍 cials

is consistent

that much of the corruption that we observe in China is instrumental

Political Advantages of Corruption as a Method of Compensation
That selective toleration of corruption is a workable solution to the problems of incomplete and asymmetric information by itself does not explain why the Chinese authorities are
willing to live with this policy. It is also important that political considerations mitigate
against the implementation in China of incentive schemes and associated methods of compensation used in Western economies. G These political considerations are both a legacy of
the strategies adopted by the Chinese Communist Party in establishing its rule and a prod6In cOlltrast Daron Acemoglu and

Th 凹ry Ve山er (1998)

suggest a purely economic rationale for the

existence of corruption in the presence of asymmetric information. In their model corruption is incidental ,
in the sense of being too costly for the authorities to prevent , rather than instrumental

8

lI ct

of the Party 's goal of maintaining its cohesiveness and absolllte political power , which

continlles to yield large benefits to Party members
Most importantly, lI sing selective toleration of corruption as a method of compensation
creates a sitllation in which the Party hierarchy always

“has

something刊 on

most Party

members and local officials. As Susan Shirk observes (1993 , page 144) ,
Because an individual knows that higher-ups could charge him with corruption
at any time , lack of exposure is in effect special treatment for which the official
gratefully exchanges his political support
Using selective toleration of corruption as a method of compensation enhances t he cont rol
of the P arty hierarchy over Party members and lo cal 。而 cials and helps the Party hierarchy
to maintai n its political power while it is decentralizing economic decision making
Other political considerations also may be relevant. For example , Party propaganda has
always claimed that every member of the Chinese Communist Party is a sel fl. ess

“public

servant of the people" . Even today the Party 's General Secretary, Jiang Zemin , admonishes
his compatriots

“to

learn from the sel fl. ess example of Lei Feng刊

An

expli cit system of

material incentives and rewards for local officials , most of whom are Party members , would
be inconsistent with this propaganda and with the myth of the benevolent nature of the
Party
In addition , although many government officials and Party members play important economic roles in China 's dllal-track economy, many others , including many of those connected
with the army , are responsible only for political , military , and other non-economic activities
An explicit system of material incentives and rewards for economic performance would undermine the political and social standing of those government officials and Party members
who are not involved in economic activities. The Communist Party, like any political organization , is a potentially fr agi le coaliti on , and jealousy and dis content , especially in the army ,
would threaten its cohesiveness. The use of selective toleration of corruption as a method of

9

compensation , by avoiding exp1icit compensation of 10ca1 offi cia1s for good l' runomir perfurmance , helps to preserve the p01itica1 and socia1 standing of those government 。而 cia1s and
Party members who are not contributing direct1y to the success of economir refolln
Punishment of Corruption
Manion (1997) provides a detai1ed description of the apparent e 叮Orts uf th 佇 Chinese
centra1 government to contr01 corruption. A1though Manion con fì. rms repor t. s of severe P\ Inishment , and even execution , of corrupt 。而 cia1s ， she a1so con fì. rms the ob 的 vation t. hat enfor cement of anticorruption measures has been high1y se1ec t. ive . As Shirk

pυmtsυ Ilt.

(199 :1 ,

pages 143-144) , “ Despite all the ta1k about corruption , Party and governmcnt 1eaders haw
punished few corrupt

officia1s 刊

The threat of punishment for corruption together wi t. h th e se1ective enf()tTem f'l\ t of thi s
threat apparent1y serves two purposes . First , with

自 sca1

decentra1ization and with ruttllp t. iotl

as a method of compensation 10ca1 officia1s proximate1y determine their 0\\'11 rompcnsa t. iυn
To make this system work e叮ective1y the Party authorities must deter 10ca1 (J fficia1s from being excessive1y corrupt 一- that is , from appropriating for themse1ves more t. han the amount
to which they are entitled. Second , in order for the use of corruption as a method of compensation to enhance the Party 's hierarchica1 contr01 structure , the Party authorities must show
that they are willing to punish any corrupt 0 伍 cia1 whose p01itica1 allegiance has become
suspect

If se1ective t01eration of corruption is to provide appropriate incentives , t. hen it mus t. be
the case that the more effort that a 10ca1 officia1 makes to promote good economic resu1ts the
1ess 1ike1y he is to be punished for corruption. There are reasons to expect the administration
of punishment for corruption to work in this way. Most importantly , the more inrome t. hat
an efficient but corrupt 10ca1 officia1 generates for his region , the more va1uab1e he is to the
citizens of his region and to the central government , both of whom share i l1 thisνrospert t.y ，
and the greater is the chance that any potentia1 rep1acement for this corrupt
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1υca1

officia1 wiU

nυ t

perfυ
叫rm 臼
as

l昀s t. he

economi c

we l l.

Th孔叫
us丸，

even if a local 0 侃 c 1 叫
al 冶
' s corrup t

1νJe
剖rfOl口mη1an ce 叫
0f 圳
h11S 閃
r'egIOn
九
1川，

the mo re likely

behav
叫10r
仙
th叫
at

the

IS

re
叭1

cent仇
i九ral

government will

aostain from pun ishing h im , beyond perhaps a slap on the hand. In contrast , cOrrllpt local
officials who seem easily rep laceab le , or , more generally , whose corrup t be hav ior is ou t of
proportion to their percei ved value , are likely to be the hapless victims of crackdowns on
corruptIOn
In addition , the more income that an efficient but corrupt local official generates for hi s
region , the m ore he can appropriate for himself wh ile still leaving enough fruits of progress
for ordinnry people to assuage their natural jealousy of his privileged position. Accordingly

>

t. he oetter the economi c pe rformance of his region , the less likely are ordinary people to

sqlleal on a corrup t loca l offi cia l or to complain about him . In contrast , a corrupt local
υ 而 rial

\\'h ose region 's econom ic performance is poor is likely to encounter popular pressure

to Pllnish him . 1n SI I 帆 although ， as Shirk notes (1993 , page 144) ,“ Laxi ty toward official
CO ITllp tJ υ11

r e furm刊，

can be viewed as a side payment to officials to give them a personal stake in

selective punishment of corruption is essential to both t he credibili ty and e 伍 c 1 ency

of the use of co rrupti on as a method of compensation

Fu ture Prospects
Our an alysis of selective toleration of corruption as a method of compensat ion in China
has focused on the strategic interactions between P arty authorities , acting t hrough t he cent ral gove mment , and the local 0伍 c ial s who , given the legacy of Chinese central p l ann inιare
efft'r t. ivel!' responsib le

fυr

promoting economic reform. We have viewed the central govern-

ment as t he principal who determines t he compensation scheme for local officia ls. The main
implicati un of our a nalys is has been that corrupti on , together with the threat of punishment
for co rrllpti on and t he select ive en forcement of th is t hreat , serves as a method of co mp e~
sa t ion tha t both sa t. isnes t he

ν ol i t i ca l

ob jectives of the Communist P arty and provides an

eff t' rtive il1 du ce men t. to lucal officials to promote economic reform
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As evidence for our claim that much of the corruption that we observe in China is ins t. rllmental rather than incidental , we have pointed to three other aspects of Chinese ('conomic
policy that complement and support the use of corruption as a method of ∞ mpensat lOn
First , the Chinese authorities have actively promoted the fìscal decentralization t. hat creates the opportunity for corruption by local offìcials. Second , the Chinese allthorities have
not instituted any alternative mechanism for providing incentives to local offìcials. Third ,
the enforcement of anticorruption measures , including punishments for corrllption , has been
highly selective
What does our analysis imply for the future course of China's economic refonn? The
credibility and effectiveness of a compensation scheme that involves the t. hreat IIf

pll l\ i 只 hmcnl

for corruption and the selective enforcement of this thrent Je jJC' nd cri tic[\ 1hυn 1' \1 1h the
central government 's reputation for reliability and its

s llr v i\'只 1

prospects of the current central government were to becom C'

\lI1

probauility. If

t.! w 叭叭'int!

c C' rtain , ancl If loc l\ l oflìci[\ 1s

were to anticipate that regardless of their economic p er fÚllllnnc C' they

ha\ ' ，、[\ S 川 1St

nnt I 只 l

probability of being replaced as a result of political changes , then the thrent IJf pll l\ ishmcnt
woul d be unlikely to deter them from engaging in excessive co rrllpti on. This ouservation
suggests that the success of the Chinese model of econo mi c reform , a model that is itself a
product of the Communist Party 's goal of maintaining its rohesiveness and
power , has depended on the Party 's ab ility to ach ieve this gon l. lf t. he
either to the stability of the Party 's hierarchy
China will h ave

to 且nd

0 1'

nlJsυ1111 1' Pυlitiral

futulρlni ngs

to its monopoly of politiral

th rea ts

po\\'凹，

another way to support economi c in cen t. ives and to maintain

then

t'cυnOlnlC

growth during the transi tion to a market economy
In any event , there is widespread agreement that China 's current dual-trnrk economy is a
transitional state that will evolve in the future into a predominantly market ecυnom~'. B 叭 ， as
we have observed , selective toleration of corruption as a method of compensat. iυn is associated
with the critical role played by local

0 伍 cials

in the dual-track economy. J> 1 l' sU Inl\lJ IY I the

evolution towards a market economy will imply a decrease in the
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imp o r t. nnceυf (,'rumxi ,

an associated decrease in the economic importance of local officials , and a transition to
methods of compensation similar to those implemented in Western economies .
prospective entry into the

\月vo rld

China 's

Trade Organization is likely to accelerate these tendencies

How economi cally and JJ oliti cally disruptive these changes will be remains to be seen
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